

The Light It Sheds

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SUBJECT: Report on C.I.A. Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970

The year 1970 fell in the mist of the Cold War era; more precisely it was in the middle of a period within that era called Détente, or in Russian, Razryadka Napryazhennosti. Détente literally is French for the relaxation of strained relations. The word entered the political stage to describe this era in the mid 1960s.¹ The Cold War was a struggle between the world's two superpowers at the time, the United States (U.S.) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.). Each power not only maintained its own sphere of influence, but wanted to expand, and struggled over the underdeveloped countries of the Third World. The conflict, thankfully, never developed into all out war but was rather expressed in a series of military coalitions, technological advances, weapons build ups, and other forms. More precisely the coalitions took form in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.) for the U.S and the Warsaw Pact for the U.S.S.R. The technological advances are most clearly presented in the space race which began on 4 October 1957 with the successful launch of Sputnik I. While the Cold War might seem petty in comparison to World War II, where an estimate of fifty to seventy million people died, the Cold War was indeed a very serious issue. It was an event so monumental that if handled wrong could have meant the end of existence – with the end coming in the form of a detonation of over sixty thousand nuclear weapons. Détente, a period during the Cold War from 1962 to 1979, was a seventeen year period where cooperation between the U.S and the U.S.S.R.

¹ Raymond, Garthoff, *Detent and Confrontation American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*. (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1994).

was thought to have been realized. Cooperation was realized, however, both powers were by no means on the same side, but before, whereas the lines were clearly drawn for others to see, the lines had become blurred. The world was not so clear cut, where the U.S.S.R. dominated one side and the U.S. another. Through various summits, negotiations were preformed, and resulted in treaties such as SALT I. The idea of peace seemed to be prevailing; this was, however, a mirage. While both sides were involved in talks, in fact neither side fully trusted the other and therefore conflict continued. Distrust manifested itself with the continuation of missiles being pointed at one another, the Third World being picked apart, and espionage being seen as a priority. While there was no outright fighting between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. there were disputes. This was manifested in wars fought in the Third World, where allegiances were sought. But unlike Vietnam for the U.S. and Afghanistan for the U.S.S.R., much of the rest of the Third World was fought over in a different way, through covert ops and propaganda. Latin America in particular was held by the U.S. with no intentions of allowing it to sway left and join the U.S.S.R. Chile in particular serves as a prime example. With a left wing government in 1970 put in place by the democratic election of President Salvador Allende, the U.S. grew concerned and began stipulating ways to change the country's stance, not wanting it to fall into Marxist hands, without the direct use of U.S. military personnel.

The primary source for this essay, entitled; "Subject: Report on C.I.A. Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970,"² is a declassified document. This document written on 18 November 1970 by the United States' C.I.A. is a comprehensive report on the activities the C.I.A. was involved with in Chile at the time – ranging from the description of key figures and their roles, C.I.A. actions and their reasoning, and possible solutions to the

² C.I.A., "Report of CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970, November 18, 1970"; available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/ch01-01.htm>; Internet; accessed 30 April 2009.

impending presidency of Allende. Realistically, the C.I.A. only perceived two possible solutions, one through the use of the Chilean Constitution, the other through military coup and the instatement of a much more accommodating leadership.

Examining the C.I.A. report one can see the efforts of the United States to maintain a clear sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere, it tried with every fiber to prevent another Cuba that would have been Chile. Cuba had shamed the U.S. by falling under communist rule only eleven years earlier. While the time period was known for being labeled Détente, this document proves that relations were not as amicable as described. The U.S. was prepared to act in Chile, using the Chilean constitution or through military coup. The fact remains throughout the Détente, the Cold War raged on, a conflagration that burnt the Third World. The Cold War was passive aggressive, only present with threats, which fail to outwardly acknowledge détente, the period that they are in. The C.I.A. report depicts a United State's fear driven, us vs. them, ends justify the means, society at the time. This C.I.A. report was created by a society that was obsessed with the cold war and control over a sphere of influence, and willing to do anything to achieve their goals.

United States' explicit intent to contain communism stemmed from 1947 when the Truman Doctrine was declared. Communism at its very core conflicted with capitalism. This is a problem because capitalism is the core of the American way of life. In capitalism merit is the defining factor, one works hard and is rewarded, and capitalism is based on the individual. Communism however sees this as fraud, that capitalism in fact rewards the bourgeoisie at the expense of the proletariat. It believes that the great betterment of society supersedes the individual, and that the individual must work for the greater good. The Truman Doctrine advocated and set a precedent in Greece and Turkey for the next fifty years of U.S. foreign

policy. In a special message to Congress, Truman stated, that the U.S. must “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”³ This idea allowed for the intervention that took place in Latin America. However, as hard as the U.S. tried, countries continued to be annexed to the Soviet Union. The Cold War escalated even further with Cuba turning communist. But, then in 1962 an era would be born that of Détente. Détente was at face value, a time period within the Cold War where relations between the two blocs of power would open up to one another, as they struggle to maintain their influence within their regions.

The C. I.A. report reveals the foreign policy strategies of the U.S. toward Latin America, specifically Chile. The United States implemented its own ruling in Chilean affairs, regardless of the past rulings of a sovereign nation’s Congress. Political situation in Chile seemed to have changed overnight, on two separate occasions. The first was on 4 September 1970 when Allende received the plurality at the end of the election, the second on 3 November 1970 when he was made President by Congress.⁴ The C.I.A. report mentioned Chilean politics many times in many forms, giving the idea that politically something can be done to thwart Allende’s ascension to president. They said this because it was true, the political situation in Chile, as well as Chilean Constitutional Law decree it possible. Votes for the election of 1970 were as follows; Salvador Allende Gossens’ Popular Unity party with 1,075,616 votes, 36.3%, Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez’s National Party with 1,036,278 votes, 34.9%, and Radomiro Tomic’s Christian Democratic Party with 824,849 votes, 27.9%, these figures showed that Salvador Allende had won by a narrow plurality of 39,338 votes.⁵ The fact that it was a narrow plurality and not

³ President Harry S Truman's address before a joint session of Congress on March 12, 1947, http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Truman_Doctrine

⁴ C.I.A., “Report of CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970, November 18, 1970”; available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/ch01-01.htm>; Internet; accessed 30 April 2009.

⁵ “Del *"Frente Democrático"* a la *"Unidad Popular"* (1958-1973)”; available from http://www.critica.cl/html/pardo_06.htm; Internet; accessed 30 April 2009.

absolute majority allowed for action by the Congress. To clarify, a majority would have been more than half the votes; a plurality is the greatest number for one but less than half. In 1925 the Chilean Constitution stipulated that had a presidential candidate not received an absolute majority but attained the plurality, he would face a run-off election in the National Congress. The run-off election would take place between Salvador Allende, the winner of the plurality, and Jorge Alessandri, the runner-up in the election. A problem, for the U.S., remained in that on the three separate occasions, prior to that of 1970; presidents had been elected based on a plurality. It had been done that way for President Frei in the previous election. This meant that it was typical of the National Congress simply to choose the candidate with the highest number of votes. Therefore, they were most likely to affirm Salvador Allende's victory. In fact, just that would happen on 3 November 1970. Though only a plurality of Chilean voters had voted for him, a majority of Congress voted, of 153, to declare Salvador Allende President of Chile.⁶ The political situation in Chile at the time, and the U.S. take on it, reveals how driven the U.S. society that had created this C.I.A. report was. The fact that they were willing to change three precedents set by the Chilean Congress; precedents which they themselves had used to their own advantage in a prior election, proved that they were not willing to play the game fairly. The C.I.A. saw their will was more important than that of the Chilean plurality.

It was made clear in the C.I.A report that the United State believed, though unlikely, that it could prevent Allende's presidency without the use of a military coup. To this effect the document proved the United State was willing to make investments in a presidential campaign in Chile. Revealing United States' methods and thought process for altering results during elections. The C.I.A report shows a clear preference for prevention which prevailed in Latin

⁶ *La Universidad de Chile y su Registro en los Sellos de Correos de Chile*, "SELLOS DE PRESIDENTES DE LA REPÚBLICA TITULADOS EN LA UNIVERSIDAD DE CHILE"; available from <http://www.sellos.uchile.cl/presidentes15.html>; Internet; accessed 30 April 2009.

America at the time; it was better to dissuade a problem from existing than attempt to correct it once it had already been made. Throughout the 1960s, prior to Allende's campaign and the rise of Marxism in Chile the U.S. described Chile as a model for democracy in South America. The United States saw Chile as a model country, one that would counter Cuba's popularity in the developing world.⁷ With that in mind in the 1964 election, the U.S. backed Eduardo Frei Montalva with overt and covert funds and support; which resulted in Frei being declared President.⁸ However, The U.S. never truly viewed Chile as important to American national interest, aside from a few multi-national, American based companies that had developed its mining industry, many Americans had not heard of the country. The U.S. had the U.S.S.R, Vietnam, and a great deal more to worry about. In 1968, however, with Allende's Populist Party coalition gaining momentum the C.I.A. had begun to inform Washington of a possible Marxist victory. The limited amount of U.S. national interest in Chile did not dissuade U.S. President Nixon's belief that a victory that would realize the world's first democratically elected communist country would also erode U.S. prestige and strength the area. To contravene this possibility the U.S. invested in the elections of 1970. Rather than investing in singular candidate, the U.S. opted to invest \$425,000 in a "scare campaign" during which pamphlets and posters were produced that linked Allende with the violence and repression in the Soviet Union at the time.⁹ In the final days of the election, the U.S.' Ambassador to Chile in 1970, Edward Korry, had sent no less than eighteen messages to the State Department in Washington. These telegrams, nicknamed "Korrygrams" would read, in unusual language, "there is a graveyard smell to Chile, the fumes of a democracy in decomposition. They stank in my nostrils in

⁷ Chile – A Country Study, "Relations with the United States"; available from <http://www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-2520.html>; Internet; accessed 30 April 2009.

⁸ "CIA Reveals Covert Acts In Chile," CBS News, 19 September 2000.

⁹ Vasili Mitrokhin and Christopher Andrew, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World*, (New York: Basic Books, 2005).

Czechoslovakia in 1948 and they are no less sickening here today.”¹⁰ With the aid of the U.S.S.R and its investment of \$400,000, Allende managed to attain a plurality victory.¹ Nixon, later, would authorize the C.I.A. of, “[doing] anything short of a Dominican-type action”¹¹, which meant anything short of a U.S. invasion. These facts show how arrogant the leaders in the U.S. at the time were. They pushed aside the importance of national interest and choose to pursue preconceived notions. And to the extent they were willing to pursue these notions was without bound.

The report on Chilean Task Force Activities focused on the Congressional appointment of Allende to the presidency, as well as preparation for a military coup had that failed. This document reveals the thought process and extent to which the United States was willing to pursue its objectives. It reveals a society that once faced with the problem of communism would attempt to minimize intervention, while it remained realistic on its chances of success. Track I and Track II were both codenames given to C.I.A. operations in Chile under Allende’s presidency. Track I’s aim was to specifically aim at a Chilean Constitutional solution to the Allende problem. The C.I.A. report explored the idea of a Frei re-election gambit. With former President Frei’s leadership within his own party, persuadable congressional members, and the Chilean army; a Congress would elect runner-up, Jorge Alessandri, in the election. Once Alessandri was to take office, he would later set the stage for a special election in which former President Frei would run. Thus, the U.S. started both a political and propaganda campaign in support of President Frei; however, the U.S. was under no disillusion that these processes were dismal at best and that a military coup was in all likelihood their greatest proponent to ousting

¹⁰ Peter Kornbluh, “The Chile Coup -- The U.S. Hand” The Consortium.

¹¹ Nation Security Archive, “NIXON ON CHILE INTERVENTION WHITE HOUSE TAPE ACKNOWLEDGES INSTRUCTIONS TO BLOCK SALVADOR ALLENDE”; available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB110/index.htm>; Internet; accessed 30 April 2009.

Allende's Marxist government. To that effect Track II, which aim was to in sight a military coup in Chile, was also pursued simultaneously to Track I. Unlike Track I, Track II was kept secret from both the State Department and the US ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry. This was stated in the beginning of the C.I.A. Report, "This effort was to be independent of concurrent endeavors being undertaken through, or with the knowledge of, the 40 Committee, Department of State, and Ambassador Korry."¹² Track II was only seen as possible with certain givens; that the Chilean Army had to be predisposed to action. However, the Chilean Army had a long running sense of tradition, in the sense that its objective was to preserve Chile's sovereignty and a strict adherence to the Constitution. To complicate things further the head of the Army, General René Schneider Chereau, was a strict Constitutionalist and was against a military coup. His doctrine, conveniently named, the Schneider Doctrine, was declared in a General Staff meeting, that the armed forces in Chile were not a means to political power but rather remained to ensure the sovereignty of the nation. Later, he would state the exception, "the only limitation is in the case that the State stopped acting within their own legality. In that case the armed forces have a higher loyalty to the people and are free to decide an abnormal situation beyond the framework of the law."¹³ Schneider made clear, without the support of the Chilean police force – also known as, the *Carabineros* – and the removed of Army Commander in Chief Schneider, any efforts in regards to a military coup were bound to fail.¹⁴ Constitutionally, neither the Chilean Army nor the *Carabineros* saw that President Allende has done anything wrong; and while he continued to declare that he would uphold the Constitution, neither had any reason to work

¹² C.I.A., "Report of CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970, November 18, 1970"; available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/ch01-01.htm>; Internet; accessed 30 April 2009.

¹³ "El ocaso de Prats en el gobierno" *La Segunda*, September 5, 2003.

¹⁴ C.I.A., "Report of CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970, November 18, 1970"; available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/ch01-01.htm>; Internet; accessed 30 April 2009.

against him. All this reveals that the U.S. was unjust in trying to find solutions to the Allende problem. The U.S. did aim to find a constitutional solution that would appoint former President Frei to power. However, the U.S. was also realistic and quick to realize that this solution was dismal at best. It looks almost as if Nixon demanded a solution other than a military coup and the C.I.A. found one, only it was not likely to succeed. On the opposite side of the spectrum, the U.S. showed no remorse the fact that a military coup was the only real, plausible solution, and were quick to act on this intuition.

The C.I.A report revealed the extent to which the U.S. used propaganda in Latin America. The use of the press is a main focus in the report, given its own section titled “Propaganda Campaign”. The title in and of itself showed the U.S. method of skewing public opinion in the U.S. favor, dividing a nation. The way in which the U.S. pursued Track I, would later help with Track II. The U.S. had begun operations in Chile with the insertion of “four C.I.A. officers with the appearance, language, and experience to sustain the fiction of various foreign nationalities.”² However, the larger part seemed to be played by clever use of the media. A media propaganda campaign would be the U.S. active voice opposition to Allende’s winning of the Presidency. In Allende’s first steps to communize Chile, he attacked the Press. He did so in what was perceived as:

[a] rather blatant campaign to intimidate the Chilean information media through threats of assassination and violence, takeovers by so-called worker organizations, and ultimatums to the management of news-papers and radio stations.¹⁵

Until that moment the World Press had seen Chile as a rather peculiar enigma in democracy, as it was to be the world first democratically elected communist country. Reporting had been rather light, but once given the news of media suppression in Chile, the world press reacted. The U.S.

¹⁵ C.I.A., “Report of CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970, November 18, 1970”; available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/ch01-01.htm>; Internet; accessed 30 April 2009.

interventionist took advantage of public opinion toward suppression of the press through the use of *El Mercurio*, Chile's largest, most prestigious, conservative paper at the time. Using journalist, at least eight of which were under C.I.A. direction, and the world press reaction, Allende was forced to back down from suppression of the media. His show of force did have consequences: *El Mercurio* remained silent from then on. This benefited Allende greatly. A new, less direct campaign was thus created by the C.I.A., through the use of an underground press, the finance of smaller newspapers, radio programs, political advertisement, and rallies. Nonetheless, none of these compared to the advantages given by a large newspaper such as *El Mercurio*. Overall the C.I.A. managed to produce over 726 articles, broadcasts, editorials in some manor or another.¹ These tactics were used to aid either a constitutional or military solution to Allende's presidency by not promoting either but rather attacking Allende himself. TIME Magazine in the U.S. printed a cover story, with aid from the C.I.A that called for an invasion of Chile, which is not quite the direct promotion of a military coup.

These types of C.I.A operations were widespread in Latin American at the time. In Brazil, an anti-Goulart press campaign had also taken place. In Honduras, National Party of Honduras opposition party paper was shut down because of its degradation of Tiburcio Carías Andino. In Guatemala, the United Fruit Company (UFCO) managed to spread propaganda that President Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán was a communist. The U.S. funded and aided in military coups widespread throughout the region. The U.S. support of military coups in Latin America began in Guatemala with the ousting of the President, Jacobo Arbenz. Nixon claimed, "This is the first instance in history where a Communist government has been replaced by a free one."¹⁶ In the Dominican Republic, Juan Bosch was ousted by a U.S. supported military coup in 1962;

¹⁶ Jacob Hornberger, "An Anti-Democracy Foreign Policy: Guatemala," The Future of Freedom Foundation, 11 February 2005, accessed 30 April 2009.

three years later when an attempt was made to restore Bosch's government, the U.S. invaded. U.S. invasions in other countries were characteristically different than U.S. involvement in Chile. Invasions moved outside of the C.I.A. realm of covert operations and into outright military involvement. This was where U.S. mentality is truly revealed. The idea that the U.S. was in the right and that the communists are wrong is shown; the us vs. them mentality. The U.S. was quick to declare communist suppression of the press as wrong, yet the U.S. implements its own form of suppression through the use of military and economic support. The U.S. manipulation of the press to achieve their goals in and of itself can easily be compared to suppression. Yet, because it was the U.S.' action it is not perceived as wrong. It was a situation where they believe the ends justify the means.

The use of women to beckon President Frei showed validity to the idea that women are important in the U.S. campaign to thwart Allende's presidency. This reveals that the creators of the source recognized women's value in anti-communist sentiment in Latin America. Upon the recognition of this value the U.S. used these women to their advantage. The C.I.A report mentions President Frei's wife, María Ruiz-Tagle Jiménez, in particular. She was mentioned within the report with regards to "collateral efforts [...] made to influence Frei or those close to Frei." Mrs. Frei was sent telegrams from women's groups in other Latin American countries. However briefly mentioned in the source women in Chile were at the forefront against Allende's presidency. They were also considered a large voting bloc since they were allowed to vote in the 1964 elections six years earlier. In fact, on 8 September 1970 only four days after Allende's victory, women from both the National Party and the Christian Democrat Party of Chile, staged a protest out of the Presidential Palace, *La Monade*. They chanted "Chile yes, Cuba no". Then, only two days later, on 10 September 1970, women marched again, only this time to be accosted

by young men of the Communist youth. That night some men would finally act as well, and along with women would march upon President Frei's house and begged for him to act and save Chile from communism; women would also end up collecting twenty thousand signatures to that effect. In beginning most men in neither the National Party nor the Christian Democrat Party of Chile would act. When women went to the men for approval for the very first march, the women received none. Women enacted these demonstrations on their own. Men's absence from the protest seemed to reinforce the idea that men were not doing enough to prevent Allende from taking office. However, the women would soon collaborate and join in a multitude of efforts, such as the Father Land and Civic Movement. The Father Land and Civic Movement was started by Pablo Rodriguez Grez, who believed by combining the both the National Party and the Christian Democrat Party of Chile parliamentarians, he would be able to gain support for Jorge Alessandri in a runoff election. Even under the Father Land and Civic Movement, women continued to march and the media covered both Marxist and conservative aspects. *El Mercurio*, the right wing paper at the time, portrayed the women as representations of national and political interest of Chile against Communism. On the opposite side of the spectrum the left wing media ridiculed the women, declared them rich, old housewives with nothing better to do. But, as ridiculous as this all seemed to the Marxist, in fact these women were justified; the majority of women in Chile had not voted for Allende. They truly believed that Communism would unravel the fundamentals of the traditional household; a belief that was at the forefront of the presidential campaign for both the Marxist and conservatives, with one accusing and one defending. Ultimately, these women would fail to forge a women's movement. They would however become the face of the anti-Allende campaign for the next three years, until he was overthrown in 1973.¹⁷

¹⁷ Lisa Baldez, *Why Women Protest: Women's Movements in Chile* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

Telegrams came from women movements in other Latin American countries. Again Chile was not alone in having a women's movement; other Latin American countries were undergoing movements of their own against Socialist/Marxist ideas, as well as against Conservative ideals. Like in Chile, these were often grass root movements. It is important to note, that in the spectrum of feminism, which often depicts two types, "radical" and "reform" feminist, these women were part of the "reform" feminism. They, unlike the "radical," wanted to change society by playing into the patriarchy that existed. This means that instead of changing the system in power, they sought to gain power within it. Women throughout Latin American were fighting for the same reasons: inequality, repression, and discrimination, the way they fought differed from movement to movement. Brazil would be highlighted as the most major representation of conservative women rising up against Communism. In a movement prior, but very similar to the anti-Allende opposition, women in Brazil formed an anti-Goulart movement. Goulart was a communist president of Brazil. From 1962-1964, six anti-Goulart, women's movements in different parts of the country had sprung up. The biggest was the Feminine Civic Union (UCF) and the Women's Campaign for Democracy (CAMDE). These organizations worked extensively to oust the Communist rule of their country. The U.S. media would later quote in an article titled, "The Country That Saved Itself" that "without the women, we could never had halted Brazil's plunge toward communism. While many of our men's groups had to work undercover, the women could work in the open—and how they worked!"¹⁸ In other Latin American countries there were a great deal of feminist women who were in part different from those in the U.S., due to different socioeconomic backgrounds. They were part of a feminist movement known as Post-Colonial feminism, also known as Third World Feminism; this form was much more "radical" than "reformist." They were much more inclined to favor socialism. The clearest example was

¹⁸ Margret Power, *Right-wing women in Chile* (Williamsport: Penn State University Press, 2002).

women's contribution to the Nicaraguan Revolution as part of the Sandinista National Liberation Front. These women actively fought as guerrillas, making up thirty percent of the Revolutionary Army, a number so unprecedented that no other revolution can compare in women's involvement.¹⁹ Women had such a significant impact in Latin American politics at the time, and it had been the C.I.A. who had instigated the woman in both Brazil and Chile into revolting against Communism. Here is a situation where the U.S. was doing unto others what had sparked resentment of Communism within the U.S. itself. By dividing opinion and spreading fear, it hoped to mobilize women in fighting Communism. Again, this was a situation where the U.S. is revealed to be using tactics and skewing public opinion, which it accuses the Communist of using wrongly.

Religion shows a way that the United State attempts, successfully, to play on Chile's fears without letting them realize that it is in fact the United State that is afraid of the outcome. The U.S. used religion as another form of creating insurgency. Writers of this C.I.A. report understood the roots of religion in South America and the ways to use it to their advantage. The C.I.A. realized the power of religious influence and worked with various religious groups to aid the U.S. in its cause. By creating this mentality the United States is able to use religion as an apex for a great deal of anti-Allende Communist resentment. This was mentioned in regard to urging President Frei to take action, "In Europe and Latin America, prominent and influential members of the Christian Democratic movement as well as the Catholic Church were prompted to visit Frei or send personal messages to him urging that he save Chile."²⁰ In particular, the West German Christian Democratic Party was mentioned. President Frei had been elected as the Christian Democratic Party candidate. Christian Democratic movements had strong roots in

¹⁹ Luz Torres, *Women in Nicaragua: The Revolution on Hold* (June 1991).

²⁰ C.I.A., "Report of CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970, November 18, 1970"; available from <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB8/ch01-01.htm>; Internet; accessed 30 April 2009.

many Latin American countries, not surprising seeing as many countries in Latin America were Catholic. In fact, in the 1970 census, ninety percent of Chile's population was found to believe in Roman Catholicism.²¹ Yet, Allende was an atheist. Communism belief was that religion was a farce and should be replaced forcefully by atheism. Karl Marx, himself, declared his view:

Religious distress is at the same time the expression of real distress and the protest against real distress. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of a spiritless situation. It is the opium of the people. The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is required for their real happiness. The demand to give up the illusion about its condition is the demand to give up a condition which needs illusions.²²

Because of this belief, the Soviet Union had been made into an atheist state in which religion was heavily discouraged and severely prosecuted. The People's Republic of China, as well, had been declared an atheist state, banning religious practice. This fear of godlessness echoed throughout the U.S.' society, which much like Chile was a deeply religious estate. The U.S. was founded on the ideals such as freedom of religion, which is a constitutionally granted right provided in the First Amendment of the Constitution. In banning religion, communism had gone directly against this ideal. However, irony presents itself when one looks at the Christian Democratic movement in Latin America. In Europe, the party had been seen as conservative. In Latin America, a very different political and social setting, the party tends to lead a rather left campaign, which makes sense seeing as idea behind Christian democracy is applying Christian ideals to public policy. The use of religion as a deterrent from Communism shows exactly how religious the U.S. sphere of influence was, and how powerful religion was in the American ideology. The U.S. would use any and all reason to aid in its goals. The paradox, that the Christian Democratic movement in Latin America was more so in line with Communist ideals, reveals the socio-economic situation in Latin America: Latin America had a much poorer citizenry, which would gain more than it

²¹ Rex A. Hudson, *Chile: A Country Study* (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1994).

²² Karl Marx, *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

would lose with Communism. But, using religion, the U.S. easily dissuaded the Latin American populations from seeing this and realizing exactly what they could gain from Communism.

To the world Nixon was preaching Détente. Summits, treaties were the product. Meaning, at face value, that progress was being made. Yet, in South America, the U.S. refused for a country to move, democratically, to the left. The lack of the idealism of Détente was not presented within the C.I.A document. In fact, Détente was not mentioned at all. Had the U.S. in fact been relaxing, the idea of instigating a military coup in a country with ideas of leaning to the left would have been unreasonable. However, because the neither side trusted one another the U.S. could not afford another Cuba. The U.S. was still involved in the containment of Communism which proves that the Cold War was still being waged. This idea, that the war continued, was also represented in the tone, the document is written with no outward presentation to the fact that relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were getting any better. In fact judging by actions and accusations with the text, the idea that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. relationship was worsening at the time would have been much more plausible. We know, however, that Détente was a period of some cooperation. However, if one were to use Chile as a gauge for how much they trusted one another, by the looks of which was not very much.

In Conclusion, Report on C.I.A. Chilean Task Force Activities, sheds a great deal of light on the society that created it. Through its search for a constitutionally sound solution to the Allende problem, it seems that they were rather sympathetic to finding a peaceful method. However, their insight that a constitutional solution was not realistic, the fact that a military coup was seen as the only realistic solution does not seem to sway them to leaving the problem alone. They were a determined group, willing to turn themselves into hypocrites using a propaganda campaign. They were willing to use anything at their disposal, whether it was playing on

people's emotions toward religion or women rights. They were willing to turn a blind eye and say that the ends justify the means.

Epilogue

On 11 September 1973, three years after this report a military coup took place and with the U.S. endorsing General Augusto Pinochet assumed power in Chile. That the U.S. backed a dictator to displace Communism from its sphere in the middle of the Détente period was proof that peace was far away. To further add, not only did the U.S. continue to maintain dominance over its sphere of influence, but it also would in fact back a dictator known for his human rights abuses such as the implementation of concentration camps for political opponents. Human rights abuses, the U.S.S.R. brought to light later while the U.S. tried to condemn the U.S.S.R. for human right abuses within Russia. And not only does the U.S. subvert a country from following a Marxist agenda, but later it brought them to one of the truest forms of Capitalism, straight from the University of Chicago, taught by Milton Friedman: Free Market economics. But, the U.S. cannot be to blame for the failures of the Détente period and the revival which brought the Second Cold War. Russia had been doing the same thing all along, and rather the invasion of Afghanistan seemed like a much bigger reason than anything else, for the reemerging of strains between U.S. and U.S.S.R. relations.